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Abstract- Current tools and systems of detecting vulnerabilities simply alert the administrator of attempted attacks 
against his network or system. However, generally, the huge number of alerts to analyze and the amount time 
required to update security rules after analyzing alerts provides time and opportunity for the attacker to inflict 
damages. Moreover, most of these tools generate positive and negative falses, which may be important to the attacked 
network. Otherwise, many solutions exist such as IPS, but it shows a great defect due, fundamentally, to false 
positives. Indeed, attackers often make IPS block a legitimate traffic when they detect its presence in the attacked 
network.  
In this paper we describe an automated algorithm that gives the ability to detect attacks before they occurrence, then 
reduce positive and negative falses rates. Moreover, we use a set of data related to malicious traffic captured using a 
network of honeypots to recognize potential threats sources. 
I. Introduction: 
During the last years, many proposals for the use of honeypots were held. Some of them were deployed to 
waste the time of the attackers, others to reduce the activities related to spam, or to just deceive attackers, and 
some others to analyze the intrusion of the hackers. 
The applications of the honeypots are in hence completely diverse, the most important approaches are first 
presented and studied with details in this paper. 
In the context of our own experiences, we have created a distributed Honeypots-based platform as well as 
some tools for intrusion detection and vulnerabilities analysis, designed to monitor malicious traffic and prevent 
attacks in a long-term perspective. Deployed across different partners in different organizations, tour platform is 
firstly used to obtain statistics on attacks against information systems of the collaborators of our project, and 
then, to correlate results in order to reduce false positives (FP an alert for an event that is not a threat) and false 
negatives (FN an alert for an event which has not been detected but is a real threat) Note that FP and FN is a bug 
challenge for existing approaches and tools. 
Actually, combining several tools and techniques could allow remedying this problem in some cases. For 
example, if vulnerability is detected by a number of tools, the probability of occurrence may be high. 
Subsequently, the first aim of this paper is to provide an intelligent algorithm that can aggregate multiple 
techniques and / or vulnerability management tools, in order to have a more effective and evidential results, 
leading to better detection rates and reducing false positives and false negative. 
To achieve these ends, we propose through to use artificial intelligence as well as distributed network of 
honeypots-based techniques. We also propose aggregation algorithms for the evaluation, testing and 
benchmarking. Indeed, the honeypot network could help to have statistics on attacks, their origins, behaviour of 
attackers, etc. will artificial intelligence could help to provide mathematical foundation to define, specify and 
evaluate models that we will set throughout this article. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works. Then, the Section 3 
gives an overview about Data Collection Environment used as a basis to implement our intelligent algorithm, in 
the section 4 we present our algorithm with all its components, Section 5 details some results for the evaluation 
of our algorithm, Finally section 6 conclude this paper and presents our project prospects. 
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I. Related works: 
With the continuous development of honeypots in recent years, and deployment of new distributed 
honeypot-based platforms around the world, the amount of information collected becomes extremely large. 
Consequently, in several honeypot platforms, security administrators become overwhelmed with the large 
amount of data to analyse. Therefore, many researchers have recently started offering automated analysis 
solutions based on intelligent analysis methods such as machine learning, data mining and statistical tools. 
Pouget and Dacier [1] proposed a simple approach of clustering to analyze data collected from the project 
of distributed honeypots "Leurre.com". Their goal was to characterize the root causes of attacks on the 
honeypots. The purpose of this algorithm is to collect all the attacks with some common characteristics 
(duration of attack, targeted ports, the number of packets sent, etc. ...) based on generalization techniques and 
extracting association rules. The resulting clusters are more refined using "the Levenshtein distance". The 
ultimate goal of their approach is to group into clusters all sources of attacks sharing similar activity footprints, 
or attack tools. 
Alata et al. [2] proposed  simple models describing the time evolution of the number of attacks observed on 
different platforms of honeypots [Refs …]. In addition, they studied the potential correlation of attack processes 
observed on these different platforms, taking into account the geographical location of the attackers and the 
relative contribution of each platform in the overall attack scenario. The correlation analysis is based on a linear 
regression model. 
In [3], Dacier and Thonnard have proposed a Framework for the discovery of attack patterns in the 
honeynet data; the aim of this approach is to find, in a set of attack data, network traces groups sharing various 
similar models. In this work, the authors applied a method of classification based on the graphs to analyse one 
specific aspect (the set time of the attacks) of the honeynet data. The results of the groupings applied to the 
analysis of time series have allowed identifying the activities of several worms and botnets in traffic collected 
by honeypots. 
To facilitate analysis of data collected by honeypots and identification of attacks, members of the 
''Honeynet Project''[4] suggested the use of a tool called Picviz [5]. Picviz is a parallel coordinate plotter which 
allows acquisition of data from various inputs (tcpdump, syslog, iptables logs, apache logs, etc ...) and then 
,visualize and discover interesting results. This tool enables the representation of complex multidimensional 
events in a two-dimensional interface only. 
Seifert et al. [6] proposed static heuristics method to classify malicious web pages. To implement this 
method, they used machine learning to build a decision tree to classify web pages as normal or malicious. 
Subsequently, malicious Web pages are sent to a high-interaction honeypot for a second inspection. The goal of 
this method is to reduce the number of web pages, which will be inspected by the honeypot. 
Table 1 summarizes the basis (overview, data source environment, analysis techniques) of some of 
existing works. 
 
TABLE 1 
BASIS OVERVIEW OF SOME EXISTING WORKS 
Reference General idea Data Source Environment Analysis techniques used 
Pouget and Dacier et al. Caracterize root causes 
targeting honeypots 
Leurre.com Association rules Clustering  
Alata E and al. Provide models based on 
observed attacks 
Leurre.com Correlation, Linear Regression 
Thonnard and Dacier Find attack groups sharing 
diverss kinds of similarities to 
explore the underlying causes 
 
Leurre.com 
Clustering based on graphs 
 
Honeynet Project 
 
Visualization of data received 
by honeypots and simplify its 
presentation 
Honeynet 
 
Parallel coordinates 
 
Seifert and al. 
 
Classify pages as normal or 
malicious 
Honeypot client for the web Heuristic static, decision tree 
 
(IJCSIS)	  International	  Journal	  of	  Computer	  Science	  and	  Information	  Security	  
Volume	  14	  No.	  9,	  September	  2016	  
In this paper, we propose an approach that shares the same objective with the other works that we have 
described previously, with more facilities analysis of data collected from the distributed network of honeypots. 
Moreover, our approach offers more new features in comparison to other works. In fact, we offer an intelligent 
algorithm, dedicated to the treatment of security events, and enable the reduction of false positives and false 
negatives, lacking in the literature. The proposed module combines multiple vulnerability management methods, 
and is boosted by artificial neural networks; which simplifies the supervisory task for the security administrator. 
Our algorithm is evaluated through several experiments to show its performances. 
 
II. Data Collection Environment: Moroccan Honeypot Project 
This section describes data collection environment used for the scope of our project: the Moroccan 
Honeypot Project (MHP) how data is collected as well as its internal structure.  
Basically, the "Moroccan Honeypot Project" aims to provide to Moroccan scientific community of 
researchers a platform easy to deploy, allowing them collect and analyse attacks and their distribution as well as 
the hacker’s profiles, and giving administrators the required time to better protect their networks before being 
victim of a potential attack. Such procedure would decrease remarkably risks related to sophisticated attacks, 
because it will be analysed by humans who will decide if the reported activity really represents a threat or not. It 
is to highlight that MHP project is the first of its kind in Morocco. It represents an interesting way to quantify 
precisely the amount of malicious traffic occuring against information systems in Morocco, which is classified, 
according to a report in 2015, as the 3rd targeted county in Africa. Such projects becomes a necessity because of 
its advantages regarding security issues and cybercrime evaluation. 
The MHP manages multiple types of honeypots and information sources. It manipulates many types of 
High interaction honeypots such as Dionaea [7], kippo [8] and P0f [9], as well as the famous IDS Snort [10], 
consisting of physical machines running real operating systems (UBUNTU 14.04). The MHP honeynet supports 
multiple subnets consisting of IP addresses contributed by different organizations participating in the research. 
The main server collects multiple sources of information from different distributed devices (e.g., Snort events 
from Snort Sensors, and malware from Dionaea, OS fingerprints from P0f, passwords from kippo and more), 
analyses the data, and presents it to users in an efficient and actionable manner.  
MHP is based on the Modern Honey Network [11], which is an open source Framework for Management of 
distributed honeypots developed by ThreatStream. It provides deployment and events aggregation capabilities 
for several of the current open source honeypots available; it supports external and internal honeypot 
deployments at a large and distributed scale. It is used as a basis for the MHP project in addition to several open 
source tools such as the famous SIEM “Splunk”. 
There are many factors behind choosing MHN as a basis of the MHP Project. Firstly, Honeypots are 
allocated from MHN central server in the distributed sensors, which sent in turn the collected data to a central 
server acting as processing engine and database server. Secondly, the damage impact is lower and only limited 
in honeypots sensors. This characteristic is important, as it’s possible to cause loss or destruction of information 
or system’s integrity, so this issue is highly considerable in MHN architecture. 
Basically, from MHP, there are two key functionalities required to mention: event aggregation capabilities 
and honeypot installation and configuration scripts. The installation and configurations scripts are written in 
bash language and include support for several types of honeypots, such as: Dionaea, Kippo, Wordpot, Snort and 
many others.. The data aggregation involves the centralization of the captured malicious traffic from the 
network of sensors. Each honeypot is specialized in a kind of data, for example Kippo presents most used users 
and passwords, Dionaea aims to trap malwares exploiting vulnerabilities exposed by services offered over a 
network, and ultimately obtain a copy of the malware, etc. These data includes also source IP, attacked port, 
associated protocol and geo-location with a real time map. 
To understand how it works, the MHP’s architecture is structured in six layers, as shown in figure 1.  
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Figure 1. The MHP’s Architecture. 
 
The first layer is the Honeypot sensors. When it’s compromised, data related to attacks is sent to the 
MHP central server, this operation is made by Hpfeeds [12]. 
Hpfeeds, The second layer, is a protocol ensuring the creation of a secure channel for transmitted data. 
Hpfeeds is actually a lightweight authenticated publish-subscribe protocol largely used with honeypot 
technology. 
Although the data is received into the Platform, we’re in the phase of processing; Mnemosyne [13] is 
the component that deals with it. It has three main objectives: (1) providing immutable persistence for hpfeeds, 
(2) offering the normalization of data, and finally (3) exposing the normalized data through a Rest API. 
Finally, the last layer consists in a web application, serves as user interface to consult the data from 
database. It is implemented with Flask, which is a micro-framework that combines a frontend implemented with 
HTML templates and a backend in Python. 
Another tool used is honeymap, which allow us to have real time map characterising geo-location of 
attacks occurring against our sensors. 
Captured data details and their use in analyzing security issues are discussed in the next sections. 
 
III. Data analysis Framework 
A. Overview and main architecture 
In this section, we will present the main contribution of this paper, which is modeling an intelligent and 
automatic technique to reduce FP and FN. Our algorithm is be based on several methods of detecting 
vulnerabilities, and boosted by the neural networks, with the main objective to simplify the task of security 
administrator. This algorithm will be implemented in Rest API layer on the MHP server. 
  The intelligent algorithm based on the fact of using several sensors installed within the same site and 
being able to find the same attack signature. The architecture of a site is shown in the Figure 2: 
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Figure 2. Detailed diagram of a member site. 
Basically, as none of the deployed sensors (honeypot or IDS) is perfect (e.g., each one of them commits 
false negative and generates false positive), we use a probabilistic model for calculating credibility parameters 
of each sensor; and based on these parameters, the artificial neural network [14] decide whether an alert is 
associated with a real attack or not.  
 
As we use the Moroccan Honeypot Project as Data collection environment, our Framework will be 
implemented within the architecture of the MHP; Figure 3 shows the integration of our system with its 
components: 
  
 
Figure 3. Integration of the intelligent framework into MHP Architecture. 
Firstly, once data is collected from a member site through Hpfeed’s channels, Mnemosyne in engaged 
to normalize and store it into MHP database. The next step is then proceeding to the analysis of this data (which 
is achieved by our framework). 
The last three components makes our framework: (1) the aggregation component allows to gather the 
sessions of attacks following certain criteria into sets called Meta-alerts, (2) the framework DB component is a 
MySQL database that stores the data necessary for the proper functioning of the two components, aggregation 
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and verification, and also to accommodate the meta-alerts verified by the (3) verification component.  
These components are described more in details in the rest of this Section. 
B. The Aggregation Component 
The aggregation component allows us to gather the alerts associated to the same attack session, that is 
to say the same timestamp, the same socket and the same attack signature. 
Aggregation provides as output a meta-alert that contains both the information about attack session 
concerned, the list of sensors that have generated alerts, and also the list of sensors in the same member site, 
which may help to detect the attack signature concerned and have not generated alerts. 
Basically, a Meta-alert associated with a signature can be modelled mathematically by a combination 
(𝑎1..., 𝑎𝑖, ..., 𝑎𝑁.) Written under the base B as: 
• if 𝑎𝑖 = 1: the sensor with the index 'i' has issued an alert. 
• if 𝑎𝑖 = 0: the sensor with the index 'i' has not issued anything. 
• N: number of sensor that can detect the signature. 
• B: (sensor  1, ..., sensor 𝑖, ..., sensor 𝑁). 
The aggregation component periodically collects all the standardized alerts with a timestamp greater 
than the date of the last collection from layer 4 of the MHP, which is the database. Then (after a meta-alert is 
closed), the meta-alert is forwarded to the audit component. 
 
Figure 4. Method of the meta-alert class responsible to aggregate sessions. 
C. The Verification component 
The verification component is the intelligent component of our framework; it is thus responsible for 
deciding whether a meta-alert has a "Real threat" or a "False threat". 
The functioning of this component is divided in two phases, the first one called the learning phase, in 
which we calculate the parameters allowing the verification. The second one called real time recognition, in 
which the verification component uses the parameters calculated during the learning phase to classify the 
generated meta-alerts by the aggregation component. 
As mentioned earlier, a meta-alert associated with an attack signature is translated in a combination 
(𝑎1,..., 𝑎𝑖 , ...., 𝑎𝑁). Based on the N binary values of this combination the following two probabilities are 
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calculated which represent the two significant values provided to the artificial neural network which handles the 
task of decision: 
• Ptrue: is the probability of the event "the meta-alerts present a real threat." That is to say that 
all sensors that have generated alerts have "true positive" and that all sensors that have nothing 
generated have "False Negative". 
• Pfalse: is the probability of the event "the meta-alerts present a false threat." That is to say that 
all sensors that have generated alerts have "false positive" and that all sensors that have 
nothing generated have "negative true". 
Knowing that the type of traces that presents a sensor is independent of the type of traces that do other 
sensors, the calculation of these two probability formulas are (1) and (2): 
• Ptrue = ∏𝑁𝑖=1(𝑎𝑖. 𝑃 (𝑋𝑖 = 𝑇𝑃) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖). P (𝑋𝑖=FN))                                        (1) 
• Pfalse = ∏𝑁𝑖=1(𝑎𝑖. 𝑃 (𝑋𝑖 =𝐹𝑃)+(1− 𝑎𝑖). P (𝑋𝑖=TN))                                          (2) 
 
Bayes' theorem is defined as following in (3): 
 
                                                                      (3) 
 
TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT NOTATIONS USED. 
Notation Description 
M: {0,1}  1: trace is malicious, 0: if not  
A: {0,1}  1:Alert is generated, 0: if not  
p:{http,ssh...}  Used protocol to classify traces 
Type:{TP, FP, TN, FN} Type of the trace 
Xi Type of trace that represents the ith sensor 
N Number of sensors associated to the meta-alert 
 
Generation rate of the type of traces under the protocol p and the signature S 
 
Generation rate of the type of traces under the protocol p 
 
For the ith sensor of the meta-alert associated with the signature 'S' under the protocol 'P', the following 
probabilities using Bayes theorem are calculated: 
                               (4) 
P(𝑋𝑖=FP) = P(M=0/A=1) = 1 – P(M=1/A=1) = 1 – P(𝑋𝑖=TP)                                        (5) 
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                               (6) 
P(𝑋𝑖=FN) = P(M=1/A=0) = 1 - P(𝑋𝑖=TN)                                                                 (7) 
(4) (5) (6) (7) represents respectively the probabilities that the sensor 'i' present in the present time TP, 
FP, TN, FN. Similar to P (A = 1 / M = 1) P (A = 1 / M = 0), P (A = 0 / M = 0), P (A = 0 / M = 1), they represent 
respectively the probabilities that the sensor 'i' present in the past time TP, FP, TN, FN. These conditional 
probabilities are defined as following: 
                                                                      (8) 
 
                                                                       (9) 
                                                                      (10) 
 
                                                                                              (11) 
Finally, P (M = 1) represents probability of malicious trace for signature 'S' under the protocol 'P'. All 
of these five probabilities will be calculated during the learning phase. 
1) The Training Phase 
Before beginning each training phase, we first must have: 
• A training traffic composed of benevolent traces and other malicious,  
• The number of benevolent traces under each protocol,  
• The number of malicious traces for each of the attack signatures. 
The learning phase begins with the exposure of the training traffic to the sensors included in the test. 
Once alerts generated by the sensors are collected by "HPfeed" [12], normalized and indexed by "Mnemosyne" 
[13] and stored in MHP DB, they should be checked by the security administrator and then copied into the 
'Framework DB'. Based on this verification, we calculate for each sensor the 𝑅𝑝,𝑇𝑃,  𝑅𝑝,𝐹𝑃, 𝑅𝑝,𝑇𝑁 and 𝑅𝑝,𝐹𝑁 related 
to each Protocol 'p', the percentage 𝑃 (𝑀 = 1) of malicious traces under 'p', and  related 
to each signature 'S' under the protocol 'p '. These rates are calculated by the following formula and stored in the 
table "rate" of the Framework DB database (see next section): 
                                        (12) 
                                                                                                                               (13) 
                (14) 
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                                         (15) 
                                                                                                                              (16) 
                                      (17) 
                           (18) 
                                             (19) 
The next step is to merge received alerts to create meta-alerts, which will be classified following the 
attack signatures, to train the multilayer Perceptron (see next) according to different signatures. It means that we 
want the multilayer Perceptron to have a behaviour that depends on the attack signature. 
 
 
Figure 5: Multilayer perceptron implemented 
 
To make the task of supervised learning, we put into the input of the neural network the set of pairs {(P1, 
D1), (P2, d2). . . (PQ, dQ)} (Training Pattern), such as: 
 
• Pi: Is the vector [Ptrue, Pfalse] of the ith meta-alerts. 
• Di: Is the value we want to associate to Pi, it is equal to 1 (for meta-alerts pre-verified as real threat) or 
0 (for meta-alerts pre-verified as false threat). 
The training algorithm of the framework is presented by the following pseudo code: 
1. Verify and store sessions. 
2. Calculate for each sensor rate by signature and by protocol 
3. Merge sessions into meta-alerts 
4. Calculate the two meaning probabilities for each meta-alert. 
5. Execute the training algorithm for the multilayer perceptron. 
(IJCSIS)	  International	  Journal	  of	  Computer	  Science	  and	  Information	  Security	  
Volume	  14	  No.	  9,	  September	  2016	  
2) The Real-time Phase After	   calculating	  weight	  matrix	  associated	  with	   each	   signature	  in	  the	   learning	   phase,	  we	  move	   now	  to	  the	   real-­‐time	   operation	   of	   our	   network,	  in	   which	   the	   network	  decides	  the	   positivity	  of	   a	   meta-­‐alert	  based	  on	   the	   pre-­‐calculated	   weights.	  The	   verification	   function	   first	   calculates	  the	  probabilities	   of	  each	  two	  significant	  meta-­‐alert	   for	   which	  there	   are	  sensors	  that	   have	   not	  generate	   alerts,	   and	  then	  passed	  the	  two	  significant	  values	  (Ptrue	  and	  Pfalse)	  in	  the	  neural	  network.	  	  
	  Figure	  6.	  Verification	  function	  of	  meta-­‐alerts.	  	  
If the output of the neural network is strictly greater than the value '0.5', the audit function gives a label 
of 'real threat' to the meta-alert, otherwise the function tag meta-alert as a 'false threat’. Therefore, the accuracy 
of the decisions depends on the accuracy of the training data. The Framework database where all the results are 
stored, is presented in the figure below: 
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  	  Figure	  7.	  Class	  Diagram	  for	  the	  Framework	  database.	  	  
IV. Experimental Results 
This section will be a test of our intelligent system; this test is based on a set of test data generated locally 
to test the functioning of both aggregation and verification components. 
A. Set of data used 
To test the operation of our probabilistic model and implemented multi-layer perceptron, we put a test 
scenario which assumes that we have a member site connected to the main server, and contains 3 sensors that 
can detect a specific signature attack on SSH protocol. 
As we want to train our algorithm for a single attack signature and for 3 sensors Kippo, Suricata and 
Snort, we define the following parameters that describe the composition of the test traffic: 
• The number of traces of attacks by signature: 15. 
• The number of normal traces by Protocol (equivalent to the number of normal traces  by signature): 5. 
The table below describes testing dataset use. 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTION OF TESTING DATASET USED 
 Snort Kippo Suricata 
Number of testing malicious traces 15 15 15 
Number of testing benevolent traces 5 5 5 
Number of alerted sessions 17 16 13 
Number of false alerts: False positive 5 1 3 
Number of real alerts : True positive 12 15 10 
Number of malicious traces but non-alerted : false negative 3 0 5 
Number of benevolent traces and alerted : true negative  0 4 2 
Rate of malicious alertsP(M=1) 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
As illustrated in the table above, the data set consists of 46 alerts, with pre-verified attack sessions, in 
which the three sensors have committed false positives and false negatives. 
By executing the aggregation algorithm, as result we had 20 meta-alerts summarizing alerts of attack 
sessions. The following figure shows the meta-alerts created and their associated fields: 
 
Figure 8. Related meta-alerts associated to testing dataset 
So we see that the aggregation component allowed us to reduce alerts to analyze, with a discount 
percentage of 56.5%. 
B. Testing framework capabilities: 
Firstly, we launch the program to calculate different rates. The rates associated with each sensor are: 
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Figure 9. Calculated rates for each sensor 
After calculating different rates, we move now to the training phase of the perceptron, in which we 
present just meta-alerts that are not complete, it means that meta-alerts where there was sensors that haven’t 
generated alerts.  
During this phase, we made several learning experiences, in each time we change both values: 
momentum and the rate of learning, to learn the values that will converge the multilayer perceptron as soon as 
possible to the optimal rates. 
Firstly, we fixed the stop criteria of the training algorithm, and we gives to the performance index a 
maximum value of 0.02, and the maximum number of iterations is fixed at 20,000 iterations. 
• Exp1: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.5' and a momentum equal to '0.1'.  
 
Figure 10. Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 1. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0199 in 2551 iterations. 
• Exp 2: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.8' and a momentum equal to '0.1'. 
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Figure 11: Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 2. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0199 in 5574 iterations. 
Exp 3: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.2' and a momentum equal to '0.1'. 
 
Figure 12. Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 3. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0199 in 4307 iterations. 
Ø Analysis: 
In analyzing the results of the 3 previous experiences, we can see that with a learning rate equal to 0.5, we 
obtain a quicker learning. For that is fixed in the next experiences the learning rate to the value '0.5' and we 
changes the value of the momentum to try to minimize the performance index. 
• Exp 4: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.5' and a momentum equal to '0.5'. 
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Figure 13. Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 4. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0099 in 5993 iterations. 
• Exp 5: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.5' and a momentum equal to '0.9'. 
 
Figure 14. Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 5. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0141 in 3517 iterations. 
• Exp 6: In this experiment we used a learning rate equal to '0.5' and a momentum equal to '0.7'. 
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Figure 15: Graph evolution of the performance index in experience 6. 
The performance index obtained for this experiment is equal to 0.0026 in 4495 iterations. 
Ø Analysis 
In the 3 recent experiments, we can see that the use of a momentum equal to '0.7' next to a learning rate 
equal to '0.5', gives a minimum value of the performance index of 0.0026, which implies that optimal rate 
calculated during the experiment 6 will be the best suited for a similar traffic to the training data. 
V. Conclusion: 
In this paper, we propose an automatic approach dedicated to reduce false positive and false negative from 
set of data collected by a distributed network of honeypots/IDS, and discover their characteristics. The analysis 
technique is based on machine learning method; Neural networks, our experimentation shows that we can 
reduce alerts to analyze, with a discount percentage of 56.5%. 
The experimentation has also conducted to identify the minimum value of the performance index, which is 
the best suited for a similar traffic to the training data. 
As a future work, we plan to expand the functionalities of our Framework, so that it can have a web 
application to better present the obtained results. 
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